![]() Information philosophy replaces the metaphysical necessity of reductionist naturalism and eliminative materialism with genuine metaphysical possibility.ĭeterminist reductionists and eliminative materialists assume that causal control works "bottom-up." The motions and forces between the physical particles determine everything chemical, biological, and psychological. Information is the fundamental metaphysical connection between idealism and materialism. This is the solution to the mind-body problem and the free will problem, which depends on the possibility of choosing between different actions. As they grow, their information increases, new capabilities emerge.Īnd information in living things (ideas, thoughts, intentions, purposes) can exert causal control over material things. Living things are dynamic and growing information structures, forms through which matter and energy continuously flow. What idealist, holists, and gestaltists think they see is actually this increase of immaterial information. It has been increasing since the beginning of time. See the cosmic creation process.īut information is not conserved. There is just the same total amount of matter and energy today as there was at the universe origin. Information is neither matter nor energy, although it needs matter to be embodied and energy to be communicated. How Information Philosophy Explains Emergence Though even if there were an indeterministic "uncaused" cause (a causa sui), it would still be a physical cause. ![]() Usually this is taken to mean that deterministic physical laws will eventually be found that explain everything. The world is said to be " causally closed." "Physicalism" is the idea that everything that is caused has a physical cause. Reductionism, by contrast, argues that everything can be explained by (reduced to) the basic laws of physics. Thus chemistry has properties not derivable from physics, biology properties not derivable from chemistry, and psychology properties not derivable from biology. The basic idea of emergence is that there are properties - perhaps even "laws" - at the upper hierarchical levels of nature that are not derivable from or reducible to the properties and laws of the lower levels. Adolphe Quételet Jürgen Renn Juan Roederer Jerome Rothstein David Ruelle Tilman Sauerīiosemiotics Free Will Mental Causation James SymposiumĪlthough the concept of emergence has become very popular in the last few decades in connection with the development of chaos and complexity theories, it is actually a very old idea, dating at least to the nineteenth century, with some hints of it in ancient and medieval philosophy. ![]()
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